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Five years have passed since Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation and 
Ben Ali’s departure, and ambivalence prevails in the representations 
and perceptions of Tunisia. While the international community 
celebrates Tunisia as the Arab world’s sole example of a successful 
transition towards democracy, Tunisian citizens are disillusioned 
with the unfinished democratisation process, sapped by terrorism, 
unemployment and unrelenting corruption. Putting aside the over-
simplistic categories of success or failure, this paper offers a review of 
the social and political changes that have been achieved since 2011. 
It contextualises historical developments that have thrown Tunisia 
into turmoil since the “Arab Spring”, in order to give a more accurate 
picture of specifically the Tunisian trajectory.
It also aims to examine the processes at play behind the redistribution 
of political power, and the renegotiation of cultural and religious 
norms, which have been on-going since 2011. The Tunisian 
revolutionary process is ambiguous, which invites us to take the 
opposite view of transitology; an approach marked by a unilinear 
and teleological conception of democratisation processes. This view 
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began to re-emerge after the “Arab Spring”. The 2011 
revolution was undoubtedly ground-breaking as it 
made unprecedented social and political reorganisations 
possible. However, it is crucial to understand the enduring 
influence of structures inherited from the past.   
The conference organised by Nadia Marzouki, Hamza 
Meddeb and Olivier Roy at the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies in Florence on 30-31 May 2016 
attempted to answer the following questions:  to what 
extent is the Tunisian democratic transition making 
progress at the expense of the revolutionary demands 
for dignity and social justice?  Is the process best 
described as a conservative revolution or a counter-
revolutionary democracy? Beyond the ‘clean slate’ or the 
‘transformation’ rhetoric, could we consider the changes 
introduced since the 2011 protests as the mere results of 
internal mutations?
Revolution or “Refo-lution”? 
Can the unease experienced in Tunisia in 2011 be 
considered a revolution or is it what Asef Bayat termed 
“Refo-lution”? Bayat defines revolution as a “rapid state 
transformation driven by popular support”. According 
to this definition, it cannot be said that Tunisia has truly 
experienced a revolution: state institutions have not been 
altered, the fabric of the “deep state” (corruption networks, 
police, bureaucracy, business elites) is still in place, and 
the new judicial organisations (constitutional court, 
transitional justice) are yet to be established. In fact, one 
of the unique peculiarities of the Tunisian revolutionary 
process is an attachment to state continuity, as shown early 
on when a majority of politicians resumed reformism as 
the most legitimate form of politics. This attachment has 
been a characteristic of Tunisia throughout the course of 
its history: from the Beylik of Tunis, to the national state 
after the Independence, all the way to the neoliberal era 
introduced by the Ben Ali’s regime.
Five years later, the Tunisian state appears both extremely 
resilient - especially compared to other Arab states that 
have embarked on revolutionary journeys - and decaying. 
In fact, factors that all pose substantial challenges to the 
ideal of state continuity include the expansion of the 
informal economy and of corruption; the weakening 
of borders; the proliferation of protest movements, 
demonstrations, sit-ins; the take-over of spaces; and 
strikes. A question remains: how can the singularity of 
the Tunisian revolution be apprehended? Perhaps it is as a 
slow and chaotic process of state transformation in which 
past structures and memories are renegotiated rather 
than eradicated.
How to compare revolutions? 
Despite numerous comparative studies of the different 
Arab Uprisings, few thoughts have been spared for 
the conditions of these comparisons. According 
to Paul Veyne, the point of a comparison is not to 
determine success or failure, but rather to distinguish 
and individualise. Following Deleuze, Jean-François 
Bayart suggested developing the concept of the event, 
rather than its “essence”. But, in order to grasp the 
uniqueness of the Tunisian revolution, it is essential to 
thoroughly understand how it builds into heterogeneous 
temporalities and memories. 
The Tunisian revolution stands halfway between a passive 
revolution without people (a term coined by Gramsci in 
reference to the 1879 revolt in Naples) and a conservative 
restoration. The 2011 upheavals took place in the absence 
of revolutionary elite that is comparable to the Iranian 
or the Maoist elites. It was in fact the conservative 
party, Ennahda, that played a key role in the transition. 
Could the inclusion of Ennahda’s conservatives help 
democratisation (Guy Hermet), or instead lead to the 
reinforcement of authoritarianism or an illiberal form 
of democracy via the mutual assimilation of former 
Destourian and Islamist elites?
Is political Islam doomed to fail?
During its 10th Congress in May 2016, Ennahda 
announced it would drop its “Islamist” label in favor of 
“Muslim democrats”. Its leader, Rashed Ghannouchi, 
justifies this evolution in relation to the party leaving the 
opposition ranks and entering the government. In his 
view, reference to Islam was necessary when the party, 
which was unauthorised under Ben Ali’s regime, only 
existed as a force opposing the dictatorship, in prisons, in 
secrecy or in exile. After joining and partaking in political 
life after 2011, reference to Islam for opposition purposes 
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became redundant. For Ghannouchi, the challenge is 
no longer to achieve democracy, but instead to reach 
economic development and stability.
This decision confirms a hypothesis formulated in 1992 by 
Oliver Roy in The Failure of Political Islam, which stated 
that once in power, Islamist parties would inevitably 
drop all references to Sharia law or the idea of a religious 
state. This non-religious character is also a singularity of 
the Tunisian revolution, even if the non-revolutionary 
democratic Islamist party played an essential part in the 
democratic transition. This very distinction sets Tunisia 
apart from the deeply religious Iranian revolution that 
had been organised by revolutionary, non-democratic 
Islamists. 
The Tunisian case confirms two arguments developed by 
Olivier Roy regarding the failure of political Islam and 
the irrelevance of theological bias, according to which 
secularisation derives from a reform of theology. It also 
raises questions vis-à-vis the evolution of the religious 
field. In Tunisia, setting up kind of Muslim autonomous 
clerics (via the unionisation of Imams) requires both 
the State and Ennahda to abandon their monopoly over 
the religious field. But even if democrat Imams were to 
institutionalise or gain state employee status, it would not 
necessarily guarantee the pluralisation of the religious 
field. 
The naturalisation of social and political 
inequalities
According to Béatrice Hibou, two conflicting conceptions 
of politics have emerged from the 2011 revolution. 
Inherited from colonial times, one centralising notion 
representing order, stable institutions and a prestigious 
state, disregards social matters as something that 
should be “managed”. Originating from local, daily 
and neighborhood concerns, an opposing conception 
coming to the foreground is that of issue-focused local 
actions (social movements of unemployed university 
graduates, debt and access to electricity…). In fact, 
the structural divide around which the Tunisian post-
revolution social and political life is organising itself 
is not an ideological religious-secular split. It derives 
instead from a separation based on class and status that 
pits marginalised populations against the establishment. 
It is therefore essential to revisit the categories used to 
analyse the fights against social and political inequalities 
since words, labels and classifications are key means of 
government. How do inequalities continue to be justified 
years after a revolution erupted for the very sake of dignity 
and social justice? Is democracy a form of government 
that contributes to legitimising social injustice?
Similarly to events under Ben Ali, the naturalisation of 
these inequalities is today one of the most effective ways 
for injustice to be legitimised.  Since 2011, successive 
governments’ discourses on youth unemployment 
are enlightening. The “young” are regarded solely as a 
demographic category, an “age group”. Consequently, 
connecting economic and social exclusion to economic 
policies, based on an unequal distribution of resources, 
is deemed unnecessary since it appears as an unavoidable 
feature of belonging to a specific demographic. Therefore, 
this naturalising approach legitimises the different 
governments’ promotion of a wait-and-see policy, which 
is based on the illusion that youth unemployment is 
bound to disband by itself.
The tenants of transitology are fond of a linear and happy 
vision of time, viewed as a march of progress leading 
to more public liberties. However, what Tunisians are 
experiencing in real time falls short of this irenic vision. 
Instead, time is mainly perceived as a waiting period 
rather than progress or a plan. Waiting, for jobless people 
(with or without university education) living in the center 
and Southern regions of Tunisia or the suburbs of Tunis, 
refers to the feeling of boredom and the impossibility of 
projecting oneself towards the future. The unemployed 
from Redeyef, a city located in the Gafsa Governorate 
in Southeast Tunisia, complain that every day is a “copy-
paste” from the day before1. The political subjectivities 
that are taking shape while time is suspended cannot be 
compared to the mythical autonomous revolutionary 
actors who are in full control of their destiny, but neither 
can they be reduced to passive and sleepy consciences. 
Instead, it is important to understand the relationship 
between these forms of subjectivity and temporality to 
fully comprehend what makes this revolutionary process 
so singular, beyond the opposition between resistance 
and passivity.
1.  Stefano Pontiggia, « Everyday is a copy-paste : waithood among Tuni-
sian men », AllegraLab, 16 April 2016. 
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Waiting does not only mean boredom or inaction. It is 
paradoxically a form of action that jobless people in both 
the interior regions and the state engage in. These are not 
coordinated actions, but rather occasional operations 
that use waiting, uncertainty and a “battle of wills” 
against State-companies and administrations to be given 
jobs. Making people wait by managing the delay and the 
uncertainty (offering occasional assistance or favors) is 
also the main strategy used by the Governorates in lieu 
of a development policy. Waiting has become “the main 
feature of specific form of governmentality that manages 
the life of people excluded from the formal market”2. 
Is art necessarily revolutionary? 
Jocelyne Dakhlia noticed that questions regarding art 
as a universal and protest language re-emerged during 
the Tunisian revolution.  Many prominent intellectuals 
(Badiou, Zizek) have been quick to express their 
enthusiasm for this new leaderless model of revolution, 
but Tunisian artists, like every Tunisian, have been caught 
unaware by the course of events. Against the backdrop 
of the most established artistic milieus keeping quiet 
about Ben Ali’s wrongdoings, artists who have come into 
view since 2011 are indeed enjoying new opportunities 
created by the sudden liberation of public space, but 
not necessarily as self-proclaimed revolutionary artists. 
Yet conventional wisdom often mistakes contemporary 
art for an epitome of revolutionary language. Today, 
disproportionate expectations are weighing on 
contemporary art to express what social sciences are 
failing to vocalise. Is this a form of artistic populism or an 
over-romanticised imagery of revolution? Many Tunisian 
artists once close to the regime or at least above partisan 
politics, are hard-pressed by an international injunction 
to express the revolution. “Women” and the “young” 
are the chosen targets of these expectations, themselves 
based on a myth: art as emancipation. And yet, these 
requests for political and revolutionary art run counter 
to the sensitivities that Tunisian artists have expressed 
since 2011, which focused instead on the individual and 
on bodies.
2. Hamza Meddeb, L’attente comme mode de gouvernement en Tunisie, in 
I. Bono, B. Hibou, H. Meddeb, M. Tozy, L’État d’injustice au Maghreb. 
Maroc et Tunisie, Paris : Karthala, 2015.
The expected transformation of the artistic scene into 
a secondary political scene is also bringing into light 
the growing gap between a fondness for so-called 
emancipative art, and the actual indifference surrounding 
social and political realities. A good illustration of this 
gap is the arrest of artists for drawing graffiti supporting 
“zwawla” (the underprivileged) on the walls of Gabes. 
Gabes’ underprivileged did not count for much in the 
sway of public opinion that helped mobilise support for 
the graffiti artists. This further highlights the contrast 
between the world’s enthusiasm for a society viewed as 
“committed to making progress”, and the lack of social 
mobility for the most marginalised part of the Tunisian 
youth.
Tunisian democracy: A model or a threat 
for the region? 
Is Tunisia a model or an exception? Can it create a virtuous 
circle in the region? Or, is the ongoing democratisation 
process at risk of dwindling because of the spread of 
violence and instability across the region? Karim Emile 
Bitar showed that even if the Tunisian revolution has 
proven the classic domino theory wrong, a phenomenon 
of contagion has occurred with regard to representations. 
It symbolises an epistemological break for Arab people. 
Although the Arab world is going through various stages 
of counterrevolution and restoration, the revolution has 
left lasting impacts. Tunisia is not protected from all that, 
from the disruption experienced across the region. First 
came the spread of proxy warfare. Northern Africa is 
now affected by wars by proxy as showed in the Libyan 
conflict. Then followed the international demands 
for public order, and for the establishment of a savior, 
much like what happened in Egypt and in Russia, which 
materialised in Tunisia with the election of Beji Caid 
Essebsi, perceived by a large part of the public opinion 
somewhat of a Cincinnatus. In the end, instability keeps 
increasing, while the deep roots of insecurity keep being 
ignored, because of the disregard for the connections 
between security and economics. 
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